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Abstract
Generalizing the idea that price momentum can be explained by different levels
of uncertainty inherent in the information structure, we implement signal-specific
differences in uncertainty in a Kyle type model of strategic trading. We derive
the equilibrium in a single-auction setting as well as a two-trading-period model.
We show that the two-period equilibrium supports price patterns like momentum
and reversal/under- and over-reaction without relying on any additional behavioral
assumptions. Furthermore, the two-period setting can be extended to a multiple-
trading-period equilibrium model with very similar equilibrium conditions to the
original sequential auction equilibrium proposed by Kyle (1985), while preserving
the price pattern of the two-period model.
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1 Introduction
As brought up by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), price momentum and reversal are the
two most pervasive pricing anomalies existing on financial markets. They are difficult to
explain and extremely inconsistent with information efficient markets as well as rational
agents. According to rational explanations, the existence of these anomalies should be
almost impossible; otherwise, they should immediately be exploited and traded away.
Besides Holden and Subrahmanyam (2002) and Cespa and Vives (2012), who explain
momentum with an increase in information precision and Andrei and Cujean (2017), who
provide a rational model by employing word-of-mouth communication in a Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) setting, most of the prevailing models trying to explain these phenomenoa
are settled in the behavioral literature. The basic idea in this field of research is to explain
momentum and reversal by the irrational behavior of agents, like Barberis, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Hong and Stein (2007).
These explanations attribute to individuals various behavioral biases and assume that
agents would persistently act irrationally.
In this paper we shift focus from the agent to the information signal and propose
the idea that momentum and reversal are not caused by possible irrational behaviour of
agents, but rather due to the information structure on the market. We impose that not all
information is equal but differs regarding its uncertainty. Using this line of thought, im-
plementing a heterogeneous signal structure results in the occurrence of signal-dependent
under- and over-reaction, compared to a model with homogeneous information. This
establishes momentum and reversal patterns without the necessity to assume the irra-
tionality of agents.
In the literature on asset pricing under asymmetric information, there are two com-
peting equilibrium concepts, namely Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) and game
theoretic Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE). We translate the above stated idea of het-
erogeneous information by implementing the information structure of signal-specific dif-
ferences in uncertainty in a Bayesian equilibrium model of strategic trading. We show
that in such a model, momentum and reversal—two patterns seemingly inconsistent with
rational behavior—can be explained without recourse to the irrationality of traders. This
provides some evidence that the rational existence of momentum and reversal is nested in
the posed idea concerning the presence of heterogeneous information with different levels
of uncertainty.
The analysis in this paper is based on a Kyle (1985) type of model. The original
setting is modified in two dimensions: first, the informed trader only observes a noisy
signal about the true liquidation value of the risky security and not the original liquidation
value; and second, a heterogeneous information structure is introduced. There exist two
kinds of different signals, one of them having a higher degree of uncertainty than the
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other. The difference in uncertainty is modelled with the help of a higher variance in the
noise term of the signal.
We show that given these two modifications, the basic mechanics of the model still
work, although very interesting new insights into the behavior of agents emerge. Fur-
thermore, equilibrium prices support patterns of momentum and reversal.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, the modified structure
of the model is introduced by discussing a single-auction equilibrium to show the main
implications of the modifications. In a second step, we establish a two-period model
and prove that equilibrium prices in this setting on average support price patterns like
momentum and reversal. The two-period model is then further extended to a sequential
auction equilibrium with N periods, which features very similar equilibrium conditions
as those in Kyle (1985), the original paper. The main finding is that besides other im-
plications, a heterogeneous signal structure supports price momentum and price reversal
in a simple game theoretic model with a BNE.1
2 The static model
There exist three different groups of risk-neutral players. An investor who is informed,
since he observes a signal concerning the true fundamental value of a risky asset (hence-
forth referred to as the informed investor or insider). Many different liquidity traders
who do not maximize their utility but simply trade for reasons outside of the model
(”noise traders”). Their demand might e.g. stem from idiosyncratic information that is
not of common interest, such as the need to hedge against endowment shocks or private
investment opportunities in incomplete market settings (see Brunnermeier, 2005, p. 421).
A risk-neutral market maker who knows the signal structure of the informed, as well as
the aggregate order flow of the informed investor and noise traders. However, he does
not know the exact signal and the exact distribution it comes from. The basic process
is as follows. The informed investor observes a signal about the true value of the risky
asset. Given this information and taking into account his influence on price, he acts like
an information monopolist and places a market order. The noise traders— trading for
reasons outside of the model—submit their individual demand. Given this information,
the market maker sets a price, after observing aggregate order flow. When doing so, he
considers the information structure on which the informed trader bases his orders. The
whole model has the flavor of a BNE model as all players take the strategies of all the
other players as given and the market maker updates his beliefs using Bayes’ rule. How-
1The stated results are established under the restriction that the informed agent is only allowed to
play linear strategies. Relaxing this assumption should not alter the general mechanics of the model,
however it extremely increases the mathematical complexity and precludes closed form solutions.
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ever, we concentrate our analysis on the case in which the informed agent is restricted to
playing linear strategies, as they are the only ones allowing for a closed-form solution.
2.1 Derivation of the single-auction equilibrium
In a first step and to gain a better understanding, we study the major implications of the
modified setting by analyzing a static model of one-shot trading.
2.1.1 Environment
In this setting, a single risk-neutral informed trader and a number of uninformed liquidity
traders submit market orders to a risk-neutral market maker. The market maker observes
the aggregated order flow and clears the market at a single price.2 The informed trader
does not know the actual demand of the noise traders when submitting his order, but only
its distribution. The ex-post liquidation value of the risky asset is denoted by θ, which is
distributed normally with mean θˆ > 0 and variance σ2θ . The quantity demanded by noise
traders denoted by u is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2u.
3 There are
two possible noisy signals, Si with i ∈ {H,L} about the true value of θ, SH = θ+ H and
SL = θ+ L, which differ in their noise term . Both noise terms are normally distributed
with mean zero, but have different variances σ2H and σ
2
L
. Their relationship is restricted
by the inequality σ2H ≥ σ2L . This implies that SL is a more valuable signal than SH . It
has higher precision and hence incorporates less uncertainty. The informed trader always
observes only one signal, either SH or SL, with probability p and 1 − p, respectively.
However, he knows whether the signal that he observes is SH or SL. The demand of the
insider is labeled x and aggregate demand X, which comprises the quantities requested
by informed and noise traders X = x+ u, with u being the demand of the noise traders.
The price is referred to as P .
The time line of events is almost identical to the original setting in (Kyle, 1985).
First, θ is realized, the informed trader observes the signal Si about the true value of θ
and chooses his order size x. Additionally, the uninformed traders’ demand u is realized.
Second, the market maker observes aggregate order flow x + u and sets a single price P
to clear the market. Finally, uncertainty resolves and the asset pay off is realized. Figure
1 gives a time line of the events.
2As is common in this literature, the market maker is assumed to set semi-strong informationally-
efficient prices; thus, his expected profit is zero. We do not explicitly model the underlying Bertrand
competition with potential rival market makers in this paper.
3The fact that noise traders’ demand is assumed to be normally distributed makes it unnecessary to
specify off-equilibrium beliefs. Due to the normality assumption, the support of aggregate order flow
ranges from −∞ to ∞ and any order flow can potentially arise in equilibrium.
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t0 t1 t2
Informed agents
receive their signal
and choose x.
Noistraders’ demand
u realizes
Market maker ovserves
aggregate demand X
and sets price P
to clear the market
Payoff of risky asset
is realized
Figure 1: The time line shows the sequence of events in the model. At t = 0, the informed agents
receive their private signal Si and posit their market order x. Further noise traders’ demand u is realized.
In the next step at t = 1, financial markets open, the market maker observes aggregate demand and
sets a price P to clear the market. Uncertainty is resolved at t = 3 and the pay off of the risky asset θ
materializes
The expected profits E[pi|Si] of the informed trader are given by E[pi|Si] = (E[θ|Si]−P )x′.
In equilibrium, two conditions have to hold.
1. Profit maximization: For any trading strategy x′ and for any signal S
E[pi(x, P )|Si] ≥ E[pi(x′, P )|Si].
2. Market efficiency: The price set by the market maker satisfies
P (X,P ) = E[θ|x+ u].
Informed demand x is a function of the type of the signal Si, the price P as well as the
parameters of the distribution of uninformed demand u. It can be written as x(Si, P, u).
The informed agent chooses his demand taking into account his impact on price as well
as the pricing rule of the risk-neutral market maker. The signal structure of the model
can be summarized as follows.
Signal structure
The terminal value of the asset is given by θ ∼ N (θˆ, σ2θ). As the informed trader observes
one of two possible noisy signals SH or SL of the true value of the risky asset with
probability p and 1 − p, respectively. The signals follow a mixture distribution, with a
probability density function f defined as
f(S) = pfSH (S) + (1− p)fSL(S) (1)
The components of this mixture distribution are distributed as follows
SL = θ + L L ∼ N (0, σ2L) −→ SL ∼ N (θˆ, σ2θ + σ2L)
SH = θ + H H ∼ N (0, σ2H ) −→ SH ∼ N (θˆ, σ2θ + σ2H )
(2)
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The informed trader knows which of the two signals SH or SL he observes. θ and SL as
well as θ and SH are distributed bivariate normal N ∼ (µSL ,ΣSL) and N ∼ (µSH ,ΣSH ),
with
µSL = µSH =
(
θˆ
θˆ
)
, ΣSL =
(
σ2θ σ
2
θ
σ2θ σ
2
θ + σ
2
L
)
, ΣSH =
(
σ2θ σ
2
θ
σ2θ σ
2
θ + σ
2
H
)
.
Given the above distributions and applying the projection theorem for jointly normal
distributed variables, we can calculate the values of E[θ|SH ], V ar[θ|SH ], E[θ|SL]
and V ar[θ|SL].
E[θ|SL] = θˆ + σ
2
θ
σ2θ + σ
2
L
(SL − θˆ) and V ar[θ|SL] = σ2θ −
σ4θ
σ2θ + σ
2
L
(3)
E[θ|SH ] = θˆ + σ
2
θ
σ2θ + σ
2
H
(SH − θˆ) and V ar[θ|SH ] = σ2θ −
σ4θ
σ2θ + σ
2
H
(4)
2.1.2 Optimization
According to the market efficiency condition and due to risk neutrality, the pricing rule
of the market maker in equilibrium is a function of aggregate demand and is given by
E[θ|X]. The informed agent maximizes his expected profit, E[pi|Si], which comprises the
difference between the expected pay off of the asset given the signal and the price of the
asset times the quantity of his stock holdings. The maximization problem of the informed
agent writes
max
x
E[pi|Si] = E[(θ − P1)x|Si]. (5)
The risk-neutral market maker follows a linear pricing rule of the form P1 = P0 + λX
while implying that the informed investor’s demand is linear in θ and has the form
x = β(E[θ|Si]− P0). λ can be interpreted as the responsiveness of the market maker to
changes in aggregate supply and hence market depth. β defines the trading aggressiveness
of the informed investor. If β is high, the informed investor reacts more strongly upon his
private information. P0 denotes the unconditional expectation of the risky asset’s pay off,
P0 = E[θ] = θˆ. The market maker can only observe the aggregate demand of informed
and noise traders, X = x + u, and is unable to distinguish between x and u. He sets
the price conditional on his information set FU which comprises aggregate demand X,
FU = {X}. Given this pricing rule, the optimization problem 5 of the informed trader
5
can be rewritten as
max
x
E[(θ − P0 − λ(x+ u))x|Si],
resulting in the FOC
E[θ|Si]− P0 − 2λx = 0,
with x being
x =
1
2λ
(E[θ|Si]− P0). (6)
The SOC implies λ > 0, which we have imposed. Given x = β(E[θ|Si]− P0), equation 6
yields β = 1
2λ
. It becomes visible that x inherits its distribution from SH and SL.
Using the results 3 and 4 and specifying
FL =
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
L
and FH =
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
H
(7)
and hence,
V ar [E[θ|SH ]] = F 2H(σ2θ + σ2H ) and V ar [E[θ|SL]] = F 2L(σ2θ + σ2L).
Informed demand, x, is defined as
xH = β(E[θ|SH ]− θˆ) = βFH(SH − θˆ),
xL = β(E[θ|SL]− θˆ) = βFL(SL − θˆ),
and distributed
xH ∼ N (0, β2F 2H(σ2θ + σ2H )) and xL ∼ N (0, β2F 2L(σ2θ + σ2L)).
Aggregate demand, X, is defined and distributed as
XH = xH + u = βFH(SH − θˆ) + u and XL = xL + u = βFL(SL − θˆ) + u,
XH ∼ N (0, β2F 2H(σ2θ + σ2H ) + σ2u) and XL ∼ N (0, β2F 2L(σ2θ + σ2L) + σ2u).
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Given the distributions of XH and XL, X and θ are distributed jointly normal.
θ
XH
∼ N
[(
θˆ
0
)
,
(
σ2θ βFHσ
2
θ
βFHσ
2
θ β
2F 2H(σ
2
θ + σ
2
H
) + σ2u
)]
θ
XL
∼ N
[(
θˆ
0
)
,
(
σ2θ βFLσ
2
θ
βFLσ
2
θ β
2F 2L(σ
2
θ + σ
2
L
) + σ2u
)]
Based on the joint distribution of X and θ, the market maker sets the price, P , conditional
on the amount of aggregate demand X that he observes, P = E[θ|X]. The market maker
cannot distinguish between the two demands XH and XL. He simply observes X, which
is either XH or XL with probability p and 1−p. Therefore, X is distributed as a Gaussian
mixture. Due to the inherited mixture structure of X, the conditional expectation is a
weighted average
P1 = E[θ|X] = ωLE[θ|XL] + ωHE[θ|XH ]
= θˆ +
(
ωL
βσ4θ
β2σ4θ + σ
2
u(σ
2
θ + σ
2
L
)
+ ωH
βσ4θ
β2σ4θ + σ
2
u(σ
2
θ + σ
2
H
)
)
X,
with the weights ωL and ωH being defined as
ωL =
(1− p)fXL(X)
(1− p)fXL(X) + pfXH (X)
,
ωH =
pfXH (X)
(1− p)fXL(X) + pfXH (X)
,
(8)
and ωL = (1− ωH).
2.1.3 Equilibrium
Determining the coefficients in the linear BNE yields
β =
1
2λ
,
λ = ωL
βσ4θ
β2σ4θ + σ
2
u(σ
2
θ + σ
2
L
)
+ ωH
βσ4θ
β2σ4θ + σ
2
u(σ
2
θ + σ
2
H
)
.
(9)
A special feature of the model is that λ is not a constant but rather a function of aggregate
demand X, since according to 9, ωi directly depends on the realization of Si. However,
in equilibrium the informed does not know the actual value of X, as he does not know
noise traders’ demand u. Hence, he does not know λ and he optimizes using the expected
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value E[λ]. Equation 9 becomes
β =
1
2E[λ]
and E[λ] = (1− p) βσ
4
θ
β2σ4θ + σ
2
u(σ
2
θ + σ
2
L
)
+ p
βσ4θ
β2σ4θ + σ
2
u(σ
2
θ + σ
2
H
)
. (10)
In equilibrium, the coefficients E[λ] and β are defined in terms of parameters of the
distributions by solving for β and plugging in E[λ] =
1
2β
. After simplifying, β is implicitly
characterized by
0 = (1− p) β
2σ4θ
β2σ4θ + σ
2
u(σ
2
θ + σ
2
L
)
+ p
β2σ4θ
β2σ4θ + σ
2
u(σ
2
θ + σ
2
H
)
− 1
2
.
Solving the quadratic equation for β means solving a fourth-order polynomial, which has
four solutions. According to the SOC, β has to be real and positive. Thus, three of the
four solutions can be ruled out immediately, and the one surviving is
β =
√
σ2u√
2σ2θ
√
(2p− 1)(σ2H − σ2L) +
√(
(σ2L + σ
2
θ) + (σ
2
H
+ σ2θ)
)2 − 4(p− p2)(σ2H − σ2L)2.
(11)
For readability, define
Bp =
√
1
2
(
(2p− 1)(σ2H − σ2L) +
√(
(σ2L + σ
2
θ) + (σ
2
H
+ σ2θ)
)2 − 4(p− p2)(σ2H − σ2L)2),
(12)
with
√
(σ2L + σ
2
θ) < Bp <
√
(σ2H + σ
2
θ) for 0 < p < 1,
√
(σ2L + σ
2
θ) = Bp for p = 0,
Bp =
√
(σ2H + σ
2
θ) for p = 1, and
∂Bp
∂p
> 0.
equation 11 can be written as
β =
√
σ2u
σ2θ
Bp.
To gain a basic understanding of the underlying mechanics, we want to take a closer look
at the special case p = 1
2
. This gives
β =
√
σ2u
σ2θ
4
√
(σ2L + σ
2
θ)(σ
2
H
+ σ2θ). (13)
The above expression is nothing but
√
σ2u
σ2θ
, which is the original equilibrium solution in
(Kyle, 1985, p. 1319) without heterogeneous signals times the square root of a geometric
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average of the signal variances.
E[λ] - which in the following will be denoted as λˆ - equals
λˆ =
σ2θ
2
√
σ2u
1
Bp
. (14)
A special feature of the model is that λ is not a constant in equilibrium. It crucially
depends on ωH , which itself is a function of aggregate demand X. In equilibrium, λ is
hence dependent on the level of aggregate demand. The same is true for market depth,
defined as 1
λ
. If market depth is high, meaning that λ is very low, then an increase in
(aggregate) demand has only a small impact on the stock price. The opposite is true for
high values of λ and thus low market depth.
Knowing λˆ, the market depth expected by the insider
1
λˆ
is given by
1
λˆ
=
2
√
σ2u
σ2θ
Bp. (15)
The market depth expected by the informed trader depends on the amount of noise
trading given by
√
σ2u, the variance of the risky asset σ
2
θ , the variance of the two signals
SH and SL as well as the mixture weight p. The amount of noise trading and a high
signal variance increase market liquidity, while an increase in the volatility of the asset
pay off—which can be seen as an increase in the value of the insider’s information—
reduces liquidity as in Kyle (1985). However, the effect of an increasing asset variance is
accommodated by an increasing signal variance. This means that while ceteris paribus a
doubling in the amount of noise trading measured by its standard deviation σu doubles
market liquidity, a doubling in the asset’s variance does not halve market depth as it
simultaneously increases Bp,
∂Bp
∂σθ
> 0. The actual market depth in the economy is
random and depends on ωL and ωH , hence aggregate demand. Overall market depth
in the economy is given by E[1/λ]. Due to Jensen’s inequality, overall market depth
in the economy exceeds the market depth expected by the insider when conducting his
maximization,
2
√
σ2u
σ2θ
Bp < E
[
1
λ
]
.
The ex-ante expected profit of the informed trader (unconditional on S) is given by
E[pi] = p
1
2
√
σ2uBp
σ2θ
(σ2θ + σ
2
H
)
+ (1− p)1
2
√
σ2uBp
σ2θ
(σ2θ + σ
2
L
)
.
The informed’s ex-ante expected profit is also strongly affected by the standard deviation
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of noise traders’ demand. It increases with the variance of the asset’s pay off σθ, as it mea-
sures the informational advantage of the insider. Furthermore, E[pi] decreases with the
amount of noise inherited in the informed trader’s signal as this noise distorts his infor-
mational advantage. By comparison, the insider’s ex-post maximized profit conditional
on Si is of the form
(E[θ|Si]−θˆ)2
4λˆ
, which is either
E[pi|SH ] = 1
2
√
σ2uσ
2
θ
(σ2θ + σ
2
H
)2
Bp
(
S − θˆ
)2
or
E[pi|SL] = 1
2
√
σ2uσ
2
θ
(σ2θ + σ
2
L
)2
Bp
(
S − θˆ
)2
.
2.2 Comparison with benchmark
In this section, we compare the results of the static equilibrium derived in the previous
section with a benchmark setting in which the type of signal is common knowledge.4
Hence, the market maker knows the underlying distributions of S and X. This can
be seen as the classical Kyle (1985) setting with two regimes and the insider receives
a noisy signal about the fundamental value of the asset rather than the asset value it-
self. All involved parties know the prevailing regime that they are currently in. A part
of the variables defining the equilibrium as well as the key statistics of the model are
signal-dependent. In comparison, the respective variables in the benchmark setting are
all constants and not affected by the value of the signal. We have to bear this in mind
when comparing the equilibrium solutions of the two models. It can be shown that for
reasonable differences between σH and σL , BωH is a convex function. Hence, in the
following paragraph E [BωH ] is replaced by BE[ωH ]. This means that the comparison is
conducted by using the prior component weights of the mixture p and not their Bayesian
updates ωH as it makes the calculations much simpler and will not alter the direction
of the results. The equilibrium price given a heterogeneous signal structure is either
above or below the price without a heterogeneous signal, depending on the type of the
signal.5 The overall expected informativeness of the price is unaffected by the heteroge-
neous signal structure and in both cases it is unaffected by the amount of noise trading
like in Kyle (1985). However, given the two different signal regimes, the average volatility
over- or understates the volatility in the respective single regimes. Market depth in the
informationally-restricted model is not constant, but rather a function of actual aggre-
gate demand. Overall, it is lower than in the benchmark model. Nevertheless, this does
4Common knowledge implies that the informed trader as well as the market maker have access to the
signal type and take the information into account. Regardless whether they know the signal or its type,
the noise traders ignore it and act for reasons outside of the model, as already stated.
5This ambiguity is the root of resulting over- and under-reaction occurring in a setting comprising
more than one period described in section 3.3.1.
10
not hold looking at signal-dependent market depth. In the regime with high uncertainty,
market depth is on average lower, whereas in the regime with lower uncertainty market
depth is on average higher than in the benchmark setting. In general, the unconditional
expected profit in equilibrium assumes that asymmetric information regarding the signal
structure exceeds that without asymmetric information about the signal structure. This
is true unless the difference in the signal variances becomes marginal. The expected profit
of the insider further increases with the variance of the asset as well as the amount of
noise trading. By contrast, an increase in the noisiness of the signal reduces profit. The
results are the same when analyzing maximized profits.
Price Depending on the signal, the equilibrium price is either higher or lower than
the equilibrium price of the benchmark model.6 The prevailing mechanism is that given
a signal with high uncertainty, the equilibrium price exceeds the price of the benchmark
model. In the regime with low signal variance, the equilibrium price is below that of the
benchmark model. The reason for this behavior is that the equilibrium price can be seen
as a weighted average of the prices in the two regimes of the benchmark model and thus
it has to be somewhere in between the two. Technically speaking, when looking at the
linear pricing rule of the market maker P (X) = θˆ + λX, with λBenSH =
1
2
σ2θ√
σ2u(σ
2
θ+σ
2
H
)
,
λBenSL =
1
2
σ2θ√
σ2u(σ
2
θ+σ
2
L
)
and E[λEqui] =
1
2
σ2θ√
σ2uBp
, it holds that λBenSH < λˆEqui < λBenSL .
Informativeness of the price system As aggregated demand is known to all agents—
insider as well as market maker, the informativeness of the price system in the economy
corresponds to the informativeness of aggregate demand X. In other words, the equilib-
rium price is a sufficient statistic of aggregate demand. It is measured by the variance
of the fundamental value of the asset given the information revealed in the economy
V ar[θ|X]. Unconditional on the signal Si and not knowing the prevailing signal regime,
there is no difference from the benchmark model and one half of the informed’s private
information is incorporated in aggregate demand. This is due to the fact that the vari-
ance of a normal mixture is simply a weighted average of the variances of the mixture
components assessed by their mixture weights. However, when differentiating between
the two signal regimes, the informativeness of the economy compared to the benchmark
model changes substantially. For an uninformed agent, the price system over-rates the
variance in the low volatility regime and under-rates the uncertainty inherited in the high
volatility regime.
Market depth In line with expectations, the additional uncertainty in the static equi-
6This pattern is the basic source of under- and over-reaction induced by the model if there is more
than one trading period.
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librium compared to the benchmark setting reduces overall market depth as long as the
difference between the two regimes is not marginal. It can be shown that p 1
λBenSH
+ (1−
p) 1
λBenSL
> 1
λˆEqui
for all p as long as σH − σL is not marginally small.7 However, de-
pending on the different regimes, compared to the benchmark, the market is more liquid
in the state of lower uncertainty and vice versa. This is advantageous to the informed
agent, as the additional market depth helps the insider to exploit his informational advan-
tage more aggressively compared to the benchmark setting. The natural mechanism that
market makers reduce market liquidity when confronted with a better-informed insider
is thus dampened by the asymmetric information about the signal structure. Given the
properties of Bp, it is easy to see that
E
[
1
λEqui
]
>
1
λˆEqui
>
1
λBenSL
=
2
√
σ2u
σ2θ
√
σ2θ + σ
2
L
∀ 0 < p < 1.
Profit The unconditional (on the signal) expected profit of the insider in the bench-
mark model is given by E[piH ] =
1
2
√
σ2uσ
2
θ√
σ2θ+σ
2
H
and E[piL] =
1
2
√
σ2uσ
2
θ√
σ2θ+σ
2
L
. Hence, overall
unconditional expected profit in the benchmark model writes pE[piH ] + (1 − p)E[piL],
compared to pE[piH ]
Bp√
σ2θ+σ
2
H
+ (1− p)E[piL] Bp√
σ2θ+σ
2
L
in our model. While unconditional
profit increases with the amount of noise trading σ2u, as well as the value of information,
σ2θ , it is a decreasing function of the variance of the noise term, σi . These properties hold
both for the benchmark as well as in our model. However, the overall expected profit of
the insider in our static equilibrium exceeds the overall expected profit of the insider in
the benchmark model for all 0 < p < 1, as long as the difference between the two noise
terms is not marginal. Again, the classical pattern that benchmark profits are higher
in the regime with higher signal uncertainty while equilibrium profits are higher in the
regime with lower signal uncertainty is confirmed. Nevertheless, overall profits are higher
in our model compared to the benchmark case. This is intuitive as in our model the
insider should be able to monetize his additional information. The gain in profit that he
receives from being able to trade more aggressively in the low-uncertainty setting always
more than outweighs the limitation that he faces in the regime given higher uncertainty.
The same holds for maximized profits, which in the benchmark setting are given by
E[pi|SH ] = 1
2
√
σ2uσ
2
θ
(σ2θ + σ
2
H
)2
√
σ2θ + σ
2
H
(S−θˆ)2 and E[pi|SL] = 12
√
σ2uσ
2
θ
(σ2θ+σ
2
L
)2
√
σ2θ + σ
2
L
(S−θˆ)2.
(16)
7The difference in between the two regimes would have to be < 1 ∗ 10−9 to give an indication of the
magnitude.
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Compared to
E[pi|SH ] = 1
2
√
σ2uσ
2
θ
(σ2θ + σ
2
H
)2
Bp(S − θˆ)2 and E[pi|SL] = 12
√
σ2uσ
2
θ
(σ2θ+σ
2
L
)2
Bp(S − θˆ)2, (17)
if the signal structure is not common knowledge. The profits are still proportional to
market depth, like in Kyle (1985), although they are standardized by the squared signal
variance. This leads to a strong emphasis on the expected profit in the low volatility
regime.
To summarize, the equilibrium price given a heterogeneous signal structure is either
above or below the price without a heterogeneous signal, depending on the type of the
signal.8 The overall expected informativeness of the price is unaffected by the heteroge-
neous signal structure and in both cases it is unaffected by the amount of noise trading,
like in Kyle (1985). However, given the two different signal regimes, the average volatility
over- or understates the volatility in the respective single regimes. Market depth in the
informationally-restricted model is not constant, but rather a function of actual aggre-
gate demand. Overall, it is lower than in the benchmark model. Nevertheless, this does
not hold looking at signal-dependent market depth. In the regime with high uncertainty,
market depth is on average lower whereas in the regime with lower uncertainty market
depth is on average higher than in the benchmark setting. In general, the unconditional
expected profit in equilibrium assuming asymmetric information regarding the signal
structure exceeds that without asymmetric information about the signal structure. This
is true unless the difference in the signal variances becomes marginal. The expected profit
of the insider further increases with the variance of the asset as well as the amount of noise
trading. By contrast, an increase in the noisiness of the signal reduces profit. The results
are the same when analyzing maximized profits. The results above prove that knowing
whether the signal regime that the economy actually faces is valuable information that
pays to possess and is also exploited by the insider.
3 The two-period model
In this section, we expand the model by an additional period where the signal regime is
revealed after the first period. After solving for the equilibrium of the two-period model,
we examine potential price dynamics in such an equilibrium and put the results under
further scrutiny by conducting a numerical analysis.
8This ambiguity is the root of resulting over- and under-reaction occurring in a setting comprising
more than one period described in section 3.3.1.
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3.1 Derivation of equilibrium
We start out by deriving the equilibrium solution and characterizing the equilibrium price
in the two-period setting using backward induction.
3.1.1 Environment
In the two-period model, the signal type of the informed trader is revealed after the first
period. The structure of the first period is equal to the single-auction setting. In the
second period after the revelation of the signal type, additional noise trader demand enters
the market and a new round of trading starts. Figure 2 shows the timeline of events. The
informed agent does not receive any new signal. However, he is now optimizing his profit
over two periods, taking into account the pricing rule as well as the new information
set of the market maker, the new public information that enters the market after the
first period. The market maker still sets the price according to his pricing rule, now
incorporating all information available at each point in time. This means that after the
type of the signal is revealed after period one, the market maker can distinguish between
the two distributions and will do so. He revises his first-period pricing rule to correctly
incorporate the action of the informed trader in the first period in period two prices. This
leads to two possible states of the world: one based on the high-variance regime in the first
period and the second based on the low-variance regime. Additionally, this separation
in the second period inherits different levels of trading aggressiveness of the informed
trader, which causes different βs for the two mixture components of the distribution of
aggregate demand. The value function of the informed trader writes
Vt(xt) = Et
[
2∑
t=1
(θ − Pt)xt|Si
]
, (18)
where
Et[pi|Si] = Et[(θ − Pt)xt|Si] (19)
is the expected profit of the informed trader in period t. The model is solved by backward
induction.
3.1.2 Optimization
The Bellman equation writes
max
x1
E[(θ − P1)x1 + V1|Si]. (20)
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t0 t1 t2 t3
Informed agents
receive their signal
and choose x1.
Noistraders’ demand
u1 realizes.
Market maker observes
aggregate demand X1
and sets price P1
to clear the market.
Additional noise trader-
demand u2 realizes.
Signal uncertainty
resolves.
Market maker observes
aggregate demand X2
and sets price P2
to clear the market.
Payoff of risky asset
is realized.
Figure 2: The time line shows the sequence of events in the two-period model. At t = 0, the informed
agents receive their private signal Si and posit their market order x. Further noise traders’ demand u
is realized. At t = 1, financial markets open, the market maker observes aggregate demand X1 and sets
a price P1 to clear the market. In the next step at t = 2, the uncertainty about the signal structure
i = H/L is revealed, additional noise traders, u2, enter the market and informed agents place their order
for the second round of trading, x2. Market makers observe aggregate demand X2 and set the price P2
to clear the market. Uncertainty is resolved at t = 3 and the pay off of the risky asset θ materializes.
The conjectured demands of the informed trader are still assumed to be linear func-
tions in each period. They are given by x1 = β1(E[θ|Si]− θˆ) and x2 = β2(E[θ|Si]− P ∗1 ).
The pricing rule of the market maker for t = 1 is the same as in the single-auction
equilibrium and of the form
P1 = E[θ|X1] = θˆ + λ1X1. (21)
The pricing rule in t=2 is still linear, but it incorporates all information that the market
maker possesses at this point in time. In the second period, the signal type is publicly
revealed and the part of the market maker’s information set stemming from period one
becomes more precise. The market maker’s pricing rule in t = 2 can be written as
P2 = E[θ|X1, X2] = P ∗1,i + λ2iX2, (22)
where P ∗1,i is the revised price of the first period, which incorporates the additional infor-
mation about the signal type. It is given by
P ∗1,i = Ei[θ|X1] = θˆ + λ∗1,iX1. (23)
Solving the model by backward induction, the maximization of the final period writes
max
x2
E[(θ − P2)x2|Si, P1, X1]. (24)
Plugging the pricing rule 22 into 24 gives
max
x2
E
[(
θ − P ∗1,i − λ2(x2 + u2)
)
x2|Si, P ∗1,i
]
,
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yielding the FOC
E
[
(θ − P ∗1,i − 2λ2x2 − λ2u2|Si, P ∗1,i
]
= 0. (25)
Solving for x2 yields the demand of the strategic trader in t = 2 depending on the signal
type:
x2,i =
1
2λ2,i
(
E [(θ|Si]− P ∗1,i
)
. (26)
The second-order condition is given by 2λ2,i > 0.
Knowing that the value function of a risk-neutral agent is quadratic, one can utilize 26
and plug it into the Bellman equation 20:
max
x1
E [(θ − P1)x1 + (θ − P2,i(x∗2))x∗2|Si] , (27)
resulting in the FOC
E [θ|Si]− θˆ − 2λ1x1 − λ1,i
2λ2,i
(
E [θ|Si]− θˆ − λ∗1,ix1
)
= 0. (28)
The first-period demand of the informed agent is given by
x1,i =
2λ2,i − λ∗1,i
4λ1λ2,i − λ∗1,i2
(
E [(θ|Si]− θˆ
)
. (29)
The second-order condition is given by
4λ1λ2,i−λ∗1,i2
2λ2,i
> 0.
3.1.3 Equilibrium
In the two-period model, the β coefficients in equilibrium are given by:
β1,i =
2λ2,i − λ∗1,i
4λ1λ2,i − λ∗1,i2
, β2,i =
1
2λ2,i
. (30)
It becomes immediately clear that the revelation of the uncertainty regime after period
one leads to different βs depending on the signal and hence a different distribution of
aggregate demand compared to the static model.
As the model is symmetric and for reasons of simplicity, the coefficients in the high-
uncertainty regime are stated in the following. The coefficients of the low-uncertainty
regime can be obtained analogously by simply replacing the subscript H with L. A
detailed description of all equilibrium coefficients as well as the distributional details of
the model are given in appendix B.3.
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The equilibrium coefficients of the two-period model write
β1H =
2λ2H − λ∗1H
4λ1λ2H − λ∗1H2
, β2H =
1
2λ2H
, (31)
with
β2H =
√
σ2u2(σ
2
θ + σH
2)
σ2θ
√
β1H
2σ4θ + σ
2
u1
(σ2θ + σH
2)
2β1H
2σ4θσH
2 + σ2u1(σ
2
θ + σH
2)2
(32)
and
λ2H =
σ2θ
2
√
σ2u2(σ
2
θ + σH
2)
√
2β1H
2σ4θσH
2 + σ2u1(σ
2
θ + σH
2)2
β1H
2σ4θ + σ
2
u1
(σ2θ + σH
2)
, (33)
λ1 = (1− ωH) β1Lσ
4
θ
β1L
2σ4θ + σ
2
u(σ
2
θ + σ
2
L
)
+ ωH
β1Hσ
4
θ
β1H
2σ4θ + σ
2
u(σ
2
θ + σ
2
H
)
, (34)
λ∗1H =
β1Hσ
4
θ
β1H
2σ4θ + σ
2
u(σ
2
θ + σ
2
H
)
. (35)
The second-order conditions guarantee β2H > 0 as well as β1H > 0. This abstracts the
informed agent from destabilizing prices in the first period to make extreme profits in
the second period. Given that λ∗1H < λ1, it is also obvious that β1H is smaller than the
respective β of a model without two different uncertainty regimes. The informed agent
does not trade as aggressively on his information in the high-uncertainty case as he would
without having the uncertainty about the signal regime in the first period. In the case
of the low-uncertainty regime, exactly the opposite is true and the informed agent trades
more aggressively than in the case without signal uncertainty. Compared to the static
model, there exist different signal-dependent trading intensities.
In the first period, the following conditions hold in equilibrium. λ1H < λ1 < λ1L, which
implies according to equation 30 that β1H < β
∗
1H and β1L > β
∗
1L with β
∗
1,i denoting the
value of β in the respective regime without the heterogeneous signal structure. This im-
plies that compared to a model without uncertainty regarding the information regime,
the strategic trader trades more aggressively in the low-variance regime than he would in
the high-variance regime. Furthermore, it holds that β1H < β1L for 1 ≤ σL < σH and
∂β1,i
∂σ,i
> 0, which is puzzling at first sight.
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Figure 3: development of β and β − S subject to an increase in σH = σ −H over the first period of
the model and for four different levels of noise trading σu = nz = {1/2, 1, 3/2, 2}. σL is fixed at 1.
3.2 Discussion and comparison with benchmark
We first want to introduce a new variable, namely β−Si. β measures the trading activity
of the informed agent given his expectation about the terminal value of the risky asset
E[θ|Si] as well as his expectation about the price of the respective period E[P |Si]. In
the following, it is also referred to as the informed agent’s trading aggressiveness. In
comparison, β−Si is a statistic measuring the insider’s trading activity towards the pure
signal; hence, β scaled by the respective update factor Fi. Therefore, β − Si decreases
with the variance of noise trading, while β exhibits an opposite reaction and increases
with the variance of noise trading. β only captures the fact that an increasing variance
of noise trading makes it much easier for the insider to hide, while β − Si also captures
the fact that increasing σi reduces the precision of the signal.
Figure 3 shows the development of β1L and β1H as well as β − S1L and β − S1H for
different levels of signal noise in the high-variance regime σH = σ−H ∈ [1, 3]. The signal
noise in the low-variance regime is held constant at the level of 1, σL = 1. The amount
of noise trading ranges from 1/2 to 3, σu = nz ∈ [1/2, 3]. The informed agent’s trading
aggressiveness increases with noise traders’ demand in both regimes, H and L. The higher
the noise trading, the more that the strategic trader is able to act on his informational
advantage without revealing too much of his private information. Kyle (1985, p. 1316)
refers to this phenomenon that ”the noise traders provide camouflage” for the insider.
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Furthermore, β increases with the variance of the signal’s noise component in the high-
uncertainty regime, σH . The economic intuition explaining this behavior is very similar
to the noise trader effect already stated: the more uncertainty that is incorporated in
the economy, the lower the risk of the informed revealing too much information to the
market maker by his actions.
The most striking fact is the path of β1L. It not only increases with σH , but also
constantly above β1H with a steadily growing spread, β1L > β1H ∀ 1 ≤ σL < σH .
This is true despite σL being held constant at the level of one. The technical explanation
of this pattern is entrenched in equation 30. The economic reason is the informed agent’s
advantage in profitability when trading on the low-variance signal compared to the high-
variance signal. Hence, the informed agent acts more decisively on the more informative
signal, whereas he relatively scales back his reaction to the signal with the higher un-
certainty. As the market maker is unable to distinguish between the two regimes, the
informed trader exploits his informational advantage in the favorable regime and in re-
turn sacrifices some profit in the comparatively less favorable regime. The basic idea
behind this trade balancing between regimes is once again to avoid revealing too much
information—he skews his trading towards the favorable regime). The mechanism be-
comes even more obvious looking at β−S1,i. As already mentioned, β−S1,i measures the
trading aggressiveness of the informed regarding the spread between the unconditional
expectation of the asset’s pay off and the pure signal, S − θˆ. Compared to β1,i, which
measures the trading activity taking into account the difference between the conditional
expectation of the asset’s pay off and the unconditional expectation (E[θ|Si]− θˆ), β−S1,i
incorporates the effect of a higher signal variance directly into the trading behavior of the
informed agent. It shows the combined effect that an increase in signal noise in the high-
uncertainty regime has on the trading behavior of the agent when observing a certain
signal S. The graph shows a decreasing trading intensity in the high-variance regime,
as the indirect effect of an increase in β1H is over-compensated by the direct effect of an
increasing σH on signal precision. The opposite is true in the low-variance regime. As σL
is held constant at one, the effect is purely governed by the increase of β1L. Nonetheless,
trading activity with respect to a certain signal in the low-uncertainty regime increases
with σH . If the informed receives a signal in the low-variance regime, he reacts by scaling
up his trading activity, while in the high-variance regime he cuts back. The described
pattern is consistent for all mixture weights. However, the more weight that is placed on
the high-variance regime, the more aggressive the trading of the informed agent becomes
in the low-variance regime.
Figure 4 shows the development of the complete range of coefficients of the model,
β, β − S and λ, for both periods as well as regimes. In the second period β, as the first
19
nz=1/2 nz=1 nz=3/2 nz=2
2
4
6
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
0.2
0.4
0.6
β
β
−S
λ
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
σ − H
t=1
t=2
H
L
Figure 4: development of the main coefficients of the model, β, β − S and λ subject to an increase in
σH = σ −H over both periods and for four different levels of noise trading σu = nz = {1/2, 1, 3/2, 2}.
σL is fixed at 1.
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period, the level of noise trading increases in both regimes. Furthermore, β2H increases
with σH and constantly exceeds its first period peer β1H . By contrast, β2L remains
rather constant, as its sole exposure to σH is via β1L. The enhanced trading activity in
the second period is in line with the economics of the model. Trading activity/intensity
between the periods is linked by the informativeness of prices. If the informed agent
trades more aggressively in the first period, he is penalized by facing a worse price in
the second period. In the last period of trading, the informed agent no longer faces this
trade off. Therefore, in a two-period model, the informed will exploit his information
more actively with higher trading intensity in the second period. When taking a closer
look at the graph, the stated mechanism is confirmed with respect to βH but not in line
with the development of βL. The reason is an intertemporal shift of trading activity
from the second period to the first in the low-uncertainty regime. The informed agent
increases his trading intensity in the first period to exploit his additional informational
advantage concerning the state of the uncertainty regime. For this purpose, he sacrifices
trading opportunities in the second period when the state of the regime is revealed and
his informational advantage is no longer as strong. This mechanism is also depicted by
the evolution of λ. In the second period, λ2,i is simply given by 1/2 the reciprocal of β2,i
and hence the trading activity of the informed agent has a strong and direct influence
on market depth. In period one, this mechanism is much more involved, leading to an
increase in trading activity as β1L has a smaller impact on market depth in the first period
of the low-variance regime. The informed agent makes use of this fact by increasing his
trading activity in the low-variance regime of the first period.
3.3 Over- and under-reaction
In the following, we analyze the equilibrium price dynamics of the model and further
elaborate on their main characteristics by conducting a numerical analysis.
3.3.1 Price dynamics
The above-stated two-period equilibrium supports under- as well as over-reaction in
prices, without giving rise to arbitrage opportunities as prices are fully rational given
the respective information sets of the agents. The market maker quotes a price that is
exactly his conditional expectation of the pay off of the risky asset given his information.
His information set comprises observed aggregate demand. Like in the static model,
prices are a linear function of aggregate demand. In the first period, when observing
aggregate demand, the market maker does not know which signal informed demand is
based on. Hence, the price is set as a linear combination of the two possible states of the
world. In either case, there exists a mispricing compared to the price, which would exist
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given the market maker had complete information about the signal regime. In the second
period, the market maker learns about the kind of signal and is able to quote a price that
incorporates all new information up to that point. Hence, the mispricing inherited from
the first period resolves and causes the respective price pattern. It is possible to show
that the market maker systematically over- or underestimates the price in the first pe-
riod depending on which signal SH or SL the strategic trader observes. This means that
the expected price dynamics exhibit momentum and reversal patterns in the two-period
model.
Proposition 1. In the above-stated sequential two-period equilibrium, there exist two
distinct price movements between period one and two.
(i) There is always over-reaction if informed demand is based on the signal with high
uncertainty. This leads to a price reversal when the uncertainty regarding the signal
regime is resolved.
(ii) There is always under-reaction if informed demand is based on the low-uncertainty
signal. This leads to price momentum when the uncertainty regarding the signal
regime is resolved.
Given the complete information set of the market maker after the second period, the
equilibrium price of the second period P2,i writes as
P2H = E[θ|X1H , X2H ] = P ∗1H + λ2HX2H ,
P2L = E[θ|X1L, X2L] = P ∗1L + λ2LX2L,
(36)
with P ∗1,i being the hypothetical price in period one if the market maker had known the
type of the signal and X2,i being the new aggregate demand in period two. The two
hypothetical first-period prices for the two regimes are given by
P ∗1H = E[θ|X1H ] = θˆ + λ∗1HX1H ,
P ∗1L = E[θ|X1L] = θˆ + λ∗1LX1L,
(37)
with
λ∗1H =
β1Hσ
4
θ
β1H
2σ4θ + σ
2
u(σ
2
θ + σ
2
H
)
and λ∗1L =
β1Lσ
4
θ
β1L
2σ4θ + σ
2
u(σ
2
θ + σ
2
L
)
.
The actual price in period one P1 is given by
P1 = E[θ|X1] = θˆ + λ1X1, (38)
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with λ1 being a weighted average of λ
∗
1H and λ
∗
1L written as
λ1 = ωHλ
∗
1H + (1− ωH)λ∗1L. (39)
The weights are determined by
ωH =
pfX1H (X1)
(1− p)fX1L(X1) + pfX1H (X1)
and (1−ωH) = (1− p)fX1L(X1)
(1− p)fX1L(X1) + pfX1H (X1)
.
Knowing that X2,i is mean zero the expected price difference at the beginning of period
two ∆Pi = P2,i − P1 is defined by
E[∆Pi|X1, i] = E[P2,i|X1, i]− P1
= P ∗1,i − P1,
(40)
the expected price movement can be characterized by the difference between the actual
and the hypothetical first-period price. Simplifying the expression, the expected price
difference in the respective regime writes
P ∗1L − P1 = ωH(λ∗1L − λ∗1H)X1,
P ∗1H − P1 = (1− ωH)(λ∗1H − λ∗1L)X1,
and is purely governed by the difference between the values of λ∗L and λ
∗
H . It is easy to see
that P ∗1H < P1 < P
∗
1L ∀ X > 0 and P ∗1H > P1 > P ∗1L ∀ X < 0. Hence, one can on average
observe an under-reaction, momentum, following the signal with the higher precision SL
and an over-reaction, reversal, following the signal containing more uncertainty, namely
SH . This pattern is also supported by the covariances of the price changes in the different
regimes. Given S = SL, cov(∆P1,∆P2) > 0, whereas if S = SH , cov(∆P1,∆P2) < 0.
These findings are summarized in proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Depending on the signal:
(i) Price changes/returns are positively correlated given the signal in the low-variance
regime, cov(∆P1L,∆P2L) > 0 and thus exhibit momentum.
(ii) Price changes/returns are negatively correlated given the signal in the high-variance
regime, cov(∆P1H ,∆P2H) < 0 and thus exhibit reversal.
Proof. The proof of proposition 2 is given in appendix B.4.
The general correlation pattern in the economy unconditional on the signal is governed
by two effects: first, the variance of aggregate demand; and second, the mixture weight p.
It is easy to see that the model creates signal-dependent momentum and reversal patterns
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Figure 5: Development of λ∗1L, λ1 and λ
∗
1H subject to an increase in σH = σ − H for four different
levels of noise trading σu = nz = {1/2, 1, 3/2, 2} as well as different mixture weights p = {1/3, 1/2, 2/3}.
σL is fixed at 1.
and additionally allows for overall momentum or reversal in the economy depending on
the ratio of high- to low-variance signals.
3.3.2 Numerical comparative statics
In order to develop a better understanding of the properties of the price movement and
given that the direction of the effect as well as its magnitude are primarily governed by
λ, we want to more closely elaborate on the properties of λ1, λ
∗
1L and λ
∗
1H .
Figure 5 shows the development of the values of λ subject to an increase in the signal
variance σH for different values of noise trading and different mixture weights, while σL
is held constant at one. In the graph, the red and green line show the values of λ∗1L
and λ∗1H . The blue line shows the value of λ1, which the actual price in period one is
based on. The difference between the red and blue line determines the magnitude of the
under-reaction and thus is responsible for the momentum effect. The difference between
the blue and green line depicts the strength of an over-reaction in the model and thus
governs the reversal pattern. Ceteris paribus, the mispricing in either direction increases
with σH .
Furthermore, mispricing is the highest when noise trading is at a low level and it
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reduces with increasing levels of noise trading. This is in line with intuition. Given low
levels of noise trading, aggregate demand is more informative for the market maker. Thus,
the market maker reacts more strongly to his information, which increases the mispricing.
Given high levels of noise trading, the market maker does not weight his information as
heavily in his pricing rule. This is depicted in the steady decrease in the overall level of
λ. Additionally, the difference between λ∗1L, λ1 and λ
∗
1H decreases. The magnitude of the
resulting mispricing deteriorates with an increasing level of noise trading.
A change in the mixture weights p in favor of a higher probability of the low-variance
regime p < 0.5 shifts the blue line closer to the red one. This means that on average it is
more probable that the economy experiences a scenario of under-reaction. Nevertheless,
the magnitude of the price effect is smaller. At the same time, the probability of observ-
ing over-reaction reduces. Nonetheless, if an over-reaction occurs it has a more severe
magnitude, as can be seen by the larger difference between the blue and the green line.
The intuition is as follows. The market maker knows that it is more likely that he un-
derestimates the price and reacts by trying to minimize this effect. However, when he is
surprised by the other regime, the resulting price movement is more severe. The opposite
is true for values of p > 0.5. In this case, over-reactions are more likely and smaller in
magnitude while under-reactions do not occur as much. However, if they occur, they are
of greater magnitude.
4 Extension to a sequential equilibrium with N pe-
riods
In this section we extend the two-period model to N trading periods, derive the solution
to such a generalized sequential auction equilibrium and characterize its price dynamics.
4.1 The Model
In this section, we generalize the two-period setting to a model in which not only two
but N rounds of trading take place sequentially. The structure is almost identical to the
two-period setting. The signal type of the informed trader is again revealed after the
first period; however, trading does not stop after the second period but rather continues
up to period N . Overall, there are n auctions in this setting. The time at which the
nth auction takes place is denoted as tn. At each auction, new noise trader demand
enters the market. Noise trader demand at time tn, is denoted as un. In each period tn,
noise trader’s demand is normally distributed with variance σ2u and is independent over
time, although the quantity traded by noise traders in one auction is independent of the
quantity traded at other auctions. The distribution of un is given by un ∼ N (0, σ2un), with
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σ2un being constant for all n. Hence, we can write σ
2
un = σ
2
u ∀ n. This corresponds to the
original setting in Kyle (1985), assuming the time intervals between the different rounds
of trading to be one, ∆t = tn− tn−1 = 1. Informed demand at time tn is indicated as xn,
and corresponding aggregate demand of the nth auction writes Xn. The distributions of
the signal as well as the liquidation value of the asset remain unchanged. The market
clearing price at each auction set by the market maker is denoted Pn. The informed
agent does not receive any new information throughout the n trading periods. Trade is
structured in the same way as before.
The information set of the informed in the nth auction includes the signal regarding
the liquidation value as well as all past prices set by the market maker up to the current
point in time F In = (P1, ..., Pn−1, Si). The informed trader still optimizes his profits taking
into account the pricing rule of the market maker as well as the change in the information
set of the market maker after the first period. However, he now optimizes not only over
two but rather over n periods. The insider takes into account the impact of his actions
not only on the price of the current auction but also on all future auctions.
The market maker still sets the price according to his linear pricing rule, again in-
corporating all information available at each point in time. After the revelation of the
signal type at the end of period one, the market maker—analogous to the two-period
setting—is able to distinguish between the two distributions and will do so. He revises
his first-period pricing rule to correctly incorporate the action of the informed trader in
period one in the prices that he sets in future periods. The information set of the market
maker in period tn includes all prices including Pn as well as past aggregate demand
FMMn = (X1, X1,i..., Xn−1,i, Xn,i). After period one, the economy exhibits two potential
paths.
4.2 Optimization
The informed wants to maximize his expected profit. Hence, he wants to maximize
pin =
N∑
k=n
(θ − Pk)xk, (n = 1, ..., N). (41)
The maximization is conducted in two steps. First, the informed agent optimizes his
demand path up to the end of the first period, when uncertainty regarding the risk
regime is resolved. This first step is very similar to the original optimization in Kyle
(1985). The Bellman equation for the periods n = (2, ..., N) - which in the following are
denoted as m - writes
max
xm
Em [Um(xm, Pm) + Vm(xm+1, Pm+1)|Si] , (42)
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with Um being the utility function of period two and Vm the respective value function,
which is quadratic for risk-neutral agents,
Um = (θ − Pm)xm,
Vm = αm(θ − Pm)2 + δm.
Plugging in yields the following maximization problem
max
xm
Em
[
(θ − Pm)xm + αm(θ − Pm)2 + δm|Si
]
. (43)
The pricing rule of the market maker and hence the price process of the economy for the
periods (m, ..., N) starting at n = 2 is given by the first-difference equation
Pi,m = Pi,m−1 + λi,mXm. (44)
Pi,m−1 for m = n = 2 is equal to the revised price of the first period, which incorporates
the additional information about the signal type, P ∗1,i. After plugging in 44 as expression
for price, the maximization writes
max
xm
Em[ (θ − (Pi,m−1 + λi,m(xm + um)))xm
+ αm (θ − (Pi,m−1 + λi,m(xm + um)))2 + δm|Si].
(45)
The resulting FOC regarding xm is given by
Em[θ − Pi,m−1 − 2λi,mxm − λi,mum
− 2λi,mαm (θ − (Pi,m−1 + λi,m(xm + um))) |Si] = 0.
(46)
The resulting demand of the informed trader is
xm =
(1− 2αmλi,m)
2λi,m(1− αmλi,m)(Em[θ|Si]− Pi,m−1), (47)
subject to the boundary condition αN = δN = 0 and the second-order condition
λi,m(1− αmλi,m) > 0. (48)
In the next step, we maximize the first-period problem given the maximization up to
period m = 2, taking into account the optimal behavior of the informed agent up to
27
period 2. The Bellman equation writes
max
x1
E [U1(x1, P1) + Um(xm, Pm) + Vm(f(xm, Pm))|Si] , (49)
given
U1 =(θ − P1)x1
Um =(θ − Pm)xm
Vm =αm(θ − Pm)2 + δm
Pm =(Pi,m−1 + λi,mXm
Pi,m−1 =P ∗1,i = θˆ + λ
∗
1,iX1
P1 =θˆ + λ1X1.
Plugging into the maximization yields
max
x1
E[(E[θ|Si]− θˆ − λ1(x1 + u1))x1
+ ((E[θ|Si]− θˆ − λ∗1,i(x1 + u1)− λi,m(xm + um))xm
+ αm((E[θ|Si]− θˆ − λ∗1,i(x1 + u1)− λi,m(xm + um))2 + δm].
(50)
Using the fact that
xm =
(1− 2αmλi,m)
2λi,m(1− αmλi,m)(Em[θ|Si]− θˆ − λ
∗
1,i(x1 + u1)), (51)
and calling
ψ =
(1− 2αmλi,m)
2λi,m(1− αmλi,m) , (52)
ϕ = (E[θ|Si]− θˆ), (53)
we can write
xm = ψ(ϕ− λ∗1,i(x1 + u1)). (54)
Taking the first derivative regarding x1 yields the FOC
0 =ϕ− 2λ1x1 − 2ψλ∗1,i(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1) + 2ψ2λ∗1,iλi,m(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1)
− 2αmλ∗1,iϕ+ 2αmλ∗1,i2x1 + 4αmψλ∗1,iλi,m(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1)
− 2αmψ2λ∗1,iλ2i,m(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1).
(55)
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Solving for x1 and plugging back in expressions 52 and 53 results in the first-period
demand of the informed agent given by
x1 =
2λ(H/L),m(1− αmλ(H/L),m)− λ∗1(H/L)
4λ1λ(H/L),m(1− αmλ(H/L),m)− λ∗1(H/L)2
(E[θ|SH/L]− θˆ), (56)
subject to the second-order condition
4λ1λ(H/L),m(1− αmλ(H/L),m)− λ∗1(H/L)2
2λ(H/L),m(1− αmλ(H/L),m) > 0.
(57)
4.3 Market maker’s filtering problem and price process
The price process—let’s call it the market maker’s filtering problem—looks as follows.
The properties of the price process are very close to the those in the two-period model,
with the difference being that it goes beyond the second period. First, we investigate the
price process for the periods starting at m after the information about the signal regime
is resolved. The derivation is in line with that in Kyle (1985), with the sole difference
that being the informed agent observes a signal about the terminal value of the asset and
not the liquidation value itself. First, we define the beliefs of the market maker regarding
the insider’s trading strategy.
xm,i = βm,i(E[θ|SH/L]− Pi,m−1) (58)
Xm,i = βm,i(E[θ|SH/L]− Pi,m−1) + um (59)
Next, we define the market maker’s information set by FUm−1 = {X1,i, ..., Xm−1,i}. To
enhance the readability, we will drop the subscript i ∈ {H,L}, which indicates the
variance regime. This is without loss of generality, as at this stage of the model the
market maker knows the type of the signal and all the calculations are conducted for
either stage H or stage L .
We further define
Σθ,m−1 = V AR[θ|FUm−1]
ΣS,m−1 = V AR[S|FUm−1]
ΣX,m−1 = V AR[Xm|FUm−1]
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Using the results 92, 93, 94, 95 and 96 from the two-period case in the appendix, one can
show
E[Xm|FUm−1] = 0
Cov[θ,Xm|FUm−1] = βmFΣθ,m−1
ΣX,m−1 = β2mF
2ΣS,m−1 + σ2um .
Due to the linear structure of the equilibrium, the price Pm is given by
Pm = Pm−1 + λmXm,
and the market efficiency condition implies
Pm − Pm−1 = λmXm = E[θ − Pm−1|FUm].
Therefore, according to the projection theorem, λm is defined as
λm =
βmFΣθ,m−1
ΣX,m−1
=
βmFΣθ,m−1
β2mF
2ΣS,m−1 + σ2um
,
and
Σθ,m = Σθ,m−1 − (βmFΣθ,m−1)
2
β2mF
2ΣS,m−1 + σ2um
,
=
β2mF
2(ΣS,m−1 − Σθ,m−1)Σθ,m−1 + Σθ,m−1σ2um
β2mF
2ΣS,m−1 + σ2um
,
ΣS,m = ΣS,m−1 − (βmFΣS,m−1)
2
β2mF
2ΣS,m−1 + σ2um
,
=
ΣS,m−1σ2um
β2mF
2ΣS,m−1 + σ2um
.
Using the fact that
ΣS,m−1 = Σθ,m−1 + V AR[|FUm−1],
V AR[|FUm−1] = Σ,m−1,
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Σθ,m =
(β2mF
2Σ,m−1 + σ2um)Σθ,m−1
β2mF
2ΣS,m−1 + σ2um
,
Σθ,m = λm ∗ (βmFΣ,m−1 +
σ2um
βmF
),
λm can be rewritten as
λm =
βmFΣθ,m
β2mF
2Σ,m−1 + σ2um
. (60)
For the first period, the coefficients of the model are
λ∗1H =
β1HFHΣθ
ΣXH
=
β1HFHΣθ
β21HF
2
HΣSH + σ
2
um
, (61)
λ∗1L =
β1LFLΣθ
ΣXL
=
β1LFLΣθ
β21LF
2
LΣSL + σ
2
um
, (62)
and the actual λ1 is given by the weighted average, like in the two-period model
λ1 = (1− ωH)β1LFLΣθ
ΣXL
+ ωH
β1HFHΣθ
ΣXH
. (63)
The price of the first period is given by
P1 = E[θ|X1] = θˆ + λ1X1. (64)
The properties of the model between the first and second period - when the uncertainty
of the signal regime resolves - are almost identical to those in the two-period case. The
only difference is that the respective βs are now defined by the recursive equations 69,
79, 70 and 76 described in theorem 4.1. From period two onwards, for each signal regime
the model follows the general solution of the original model of Kyle (1985) with a slight
modification, given that the informed agent observes a signal about the liquidation value
of the asset and not the value itself.
4.4 Nature of the equilibrium
The following theorem gives the equilibrium solution to the N -period model.
Theorem 4.1. For the sequential model with n trading periods, a linear recursive equi-
librium exists dependent on the signal regime. The coefficients defining the equilibrium
can be divided along two sub-periods.
For the periods (m = 2, ..., N), the equilibrium is defined by the following equations.
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The solution is very close to the original equilibrium in Kyle (1985) and depends sym-
metrically on the uncertainty regime. 9
xm = βm(E[θ|S]− Pm−1), (65)
∆Pm = Pm − Pm−1 = λmXm, (66)
Σθ,m = V AR[θ|FUm], (67)
E[pim|F Im] = αm−1(E[θ|S]− Pm−1)2 + δm−1. (68)
The constants solving the system of difference equations up to period m = 2 in the re-
spective uncertainty regime are given by
βm,i =
(1− 2αmλi,m)
2λi,m(1− αmλi,m) , (69)
λi,m =
βi,mFΣθ,i,m
β2i,mF
2Σ,m−1 + σ2um
, (70)
Σθ,m =
β2mF
2Σ,m−1 + σ2um
β2mF
2ΣS,m−1 + σ2um
Σθ,m−1, (71)
αm−1,i =
1
4λi,m(1− αmλi,m) , (72)
δm−1,i = αm,iλ2i,m−1σ
2
um + δm. (73)
For the first period, the equilibrium solution is given by
x1 = β1,i(E[θ|S]− θˆ), (74)
P1,i = θˆ + λ1X1, (75)
λ1 = ωHλ
∗
1H + (1− ωH)λ∗1L, (76)
λ∗1H =
β1HFHΣθ
ΣXH
, (77)
λ∗1L =
β1LFLΣθ
ΣXL
, (78)
β1,i =
2λi,m(1− αmλi,m)− λ∗1,i
,
4λ1λi,m(1− αmλi,m)− λ∗1,i2, (79)
α0,i =
λi,m(1− αmλi,m)− λ∗1,i + λ1
4λ1λi,m(1− αmλi,m)− λ∗1,i2
, (80)
δ0,i = α1,iλ
∗
1,i
2σ2um + δ1. (81)
where λm,i and βm,i are defined by 70 and 69 and β1,i and λ1 by 79, 78 and 77.
Proof. The detailed derivation of theorem 4.1 is given in appendix C.
9For notational convenience, the subscripts indicating the signal regime are skipped in some parts.
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The price path in equilibrium up to period m = 2 is determined by 66. The price
in period one is given by 75. Therefore, the expected price change from period one to
period two is
E[∆Pm=2,i] = E[Pm=2,i]− P1 = λmXm
= P ∗1,i − P1.
(82)
Using 76, 78 and 77 this can be again written as
P ∗1L − P1 = ωH(λ∗1L − λ∗1H)X1,
P ∗1H − P1 = (1− ωH)(λ∗1H − λ∗1L)X1,
(83)
with λ∗1L > λ
∗
1H . The above result confirms the price pattern stated in propositions 1 and
2 of the two-period model for the sequential equilibrium.
According to 68, ex-ante expected profit of the insider is given by
E[pi|Si] = α0(E[θ|Si]− P0)2 + δ0, (84)
in each uncertainty regime. Inserting 80 and 81 results in
E[pi|Si] =
λi,m(1− αmλi,m)− λ∗1,i + λ1
4λ1λi,m(1− αmλi,m)− λ∗1,i2
Fi(S − θˆ)
+
λ∗1i
2σ2u1
4λi,m(1− αmλi,m) + δ1,
(85)
for m = 2 (see the appendix for the detailed calculation). Compared to a setting without
scenario uncertainty, the ex-ante expected profit of the insider would write
E[pi|S] = λi,m(1− αmλi,m)
4λ∗1,iλi,m(1− αmλi,m)− λ∗1,i2
Fi(S − θˆ)
+
λ∗1i
2σ2u1
4λi,m(1− αmλi,m) + δ1.
(86)
Looking at expressions 85 and 86, it becomes clear that the information asymmetry
about the heterogeneous information structure influences the expected ex-ante utility of
the informed investor in two dimensions. First, it directly enters in α0, in the numerator
via the difference between λ∗1i−λ1 and in the denominator via the product λ1λi,m. Second,
it influences the whole expression and all future periods by the different values of β1,i.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that patterns of security price over- and under-reaction
can exist in a simple strategic trade model with risk-neutral agents without inducing
any biases on the behavior of these agents. The result is achieved by turning the focus
away from the conduct and interaction of the agents, rather targeting the signal structure
itself. Most empirical literature like Chan (2003) or Gutierrez and Kelley (2008) as well
as theoretical models like Holden and Subrahmanyam (2002), Cespa and Vives (2012)
or Andrei and Cujean (2017) consider public news as a homogeneous information signal.
We suggest that different types of information exist and the price reaction to new infor-
mation depends on these types. More specifically, the price reaction is determined by the
uncertainty incorporated in the different types of information. Following these lines, we
have established a model that produces under-reaction given news with low variance and
thus lower uncertainty and over-reaction given news with high variance and thus higher
uncertainty. This is a very general setup and its behavior is in line with the empirical
findings of Forrer (2015), as well as the words of Fama (1998, p. 284) that
”Models dealing with predictability must specify mechanisms in such a way
that the same investors underreact to some types of events and overreact to
others.”
Furthermore, our model is not at odds with the prominent behavioral explanations of
momentum and reversal given by Daniel et al. (1998) and Barberis et al. (1998), but
rather it is complementary. Those biases seem to amplify the price patterns of the model.
The model provides an alternative source concerning how momentum and reversal can
evolve while agents make fully rational trading decisions.
For future research, it would be worthwhile to investigate how the equilibrium outcome
and the price process in the sequential equilibrium would be influenced if the information
asymmetry regarding the signal characteristics were resolved in later periods. We believe
that it should be possible to prolong the period of under- and over-reaction up to a certain
extent.
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Appendices
A The static model
Derivation of P1
P1 = E[θ|X] = ωLE[θ|XL] + ωHE[θ|XH ]
P1 = θˆ + ωL
βFLσ
2
θ
β2F 2L(σ
2
θ + σ
2
L
) + σ2u
X + ωH
βFHσ
2
θ
β2F 2H(σ
2
θ + σ
2
H
) + σ2u
X
P1 = θˆ +
(
ωL
βFLσ
2
θ
β2F 2L(σ
2
θ + σ
2
L
) + σ2u
+ ωH
βFHσ
2
θ
β2F 2H(σ
2
θ + σ
2
H
) + σ2u
)
X
P1 = θˆ +
(
ωL
βσ4θ
β2σ4θ + σ
2
u(σ
2
θ + σ
2
L
)
+ ωH
βσ4θ
β2σ4θ + σ
2
u(σ
2
θ + σ
2
H
)
)
X
Defining the coefficients E[λ] and β in equilibrium in terms of parameters of the distributions
by solving for β and plugging in E[λ] =
1
2β
.
1
2β
= E
[
ωL
βFLσ
2
θ
β2F 2L(σ
2
θ + σ
2
L
) + σ2u
+ ωH
βFHσ
2
θ
β2F 2H(σ
2
θ + σ
2
H
) + σ2u
]
0 = E
[
ωL
β2FLσ
2
θ
β2F 2L(σ
2
θ + σ
2
L
) + σ2u
+ ωH
β2FHσ
2
θ
β2F 2H(σ
2
θ + σ
2
H
) + σ2u
]
− 1
2
0 = (1− p) β
2FLσ
2
θ
β2FLσ2θ + σ
2
u
+ p
β2FHσ
2
θ
β2FHσ2θ + σ
2
u
− 1
2
0 = (1− p) β
2σ4θ
β2σ4θ + σ
2
u(σ
2
θ + σ
2
L
)
+ p
β2σ4θ
β2σ4θ + σ
2
u(σ
2
θ + σ
2
H
)
− 1
2
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Solving equation 87 for β means solving a fourth-order polynomial, which has four solutions. As
according to the second-order condition β has to be real and positive, three of the four solutions
can be ruled out immediately. The one surviving is
β =
√
σ2u√
2σ2θ
√
(2p− 1)(σ2H − σ2L) +
√(
(σ2L + σ
2
θ) + (σ
2
H
+ σ2θ)
)2 − 4(p− p2)(σ2H − σ2L)2,
knowing λˆ, the market depth expected by the insider
1
λˆ
is given by
1
λˆ
=
√
2σ2u
σ2θ
√
(2p− 1)(σ2H − σ2L) +
√(
(σ2L + σ
2
θ) + (σ
2
H
+ σ2θ)
)2 − 4(p− p2)(σ2H − σ2L)2,
and for p = 1/2
1
λˆ
=
2
√
σ2u
σ2θ
4
√
(σ2L + σ
2
θ)(σ
2
H
+ σ2θ).
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The ex-ante expected profits of the insider (unconditional on S) are given by
E[pi] =
1
2
√
σ2u
σ2θ
Bp
(
pσ4θ
(σ2θ + σ
2
H
)
+
(1− p)σ4θ
(σ2θ + σ
2
L
)
)
,
E[pi] = p
1
2
√
σ2uBp
σ2θ
(σ2θ + σ
2
H
)
+ (1− p)1
2
√
σ2uBp
σ2θ
(σ2θ + σ
2
L
)
.
B The two-period model
B.1 Optimization
As the structure of the problem is identical for both uncertainty regimes, the optimization is
valid for both regimes, indicated by the subscript i ∈ {H,L}. Knowing that the value function
for a risk-neutral agent is quadratic, one can utilize the maximized demand of period two given
in expression 26 and plug it into the maximization problem of period one.
max
x1
E [(θ − P1)x1 + (θ − P2,i(x∗2))x∗2|Si] (88)
max
x1
E
[(
(θ − θˆ − λ1(x1 + u1)
)
x1 +
(
θ − P ∗1,i − λ2,i(x∗2 + u2)
)
x∗2|Si
]
max
x1
E
[(
(θ − θˆ − λ1(x1 + u1)
)
x1 +
1
4λ2,i
(
θ − θˆ − λ∗1,i(x1 + u1)
)2 − λ2,iu2x∗2|Si] . (89)
Resulting in the FOC
E
[(
θ − θˆ − λ1u1 − 2λ1x1
)
+
1
2λ2,i
(
θ − θˆ − λ∗1,i(x1 + u1)
)
(−λ1,i)|Si
]
= 0
E [θ|Si]− θˆ − 2λ1x1 − λ1,i
2λ2,i
(
E [θ|Si]− θˆ − λ∗1,ix1
)
= 0,
(90)
and yielding
x1,i =
2λ2,i − λ∗1,i
4λ1λ2,i − λ∗1,i2
(
E [(θ|Si]− θˆ
)
.
The second-order condition is given by
4λ1λ2,i − λ∗1,i2
2λ2,i
> 0 (91)
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B.2 Distributions
The signal distribution in the two-period setting is as follows:
First Period
x1H ∼ N (0, β1H2FH2(σ2θ + σ2H )) and x1L ∼ N (0, β1L2FL2(σ2θ + σ2L))
X1H = x1H + u1 = β1HFH(SH − θˆ) + u1 and X1L = x1L + u1 = β1LFL(SL − θˆ) + u1
X1H ∼ N (0, β1H2FH2(σ2θ + σ2H ) + σ2u1) and X1L ∼ N (0, β1L2FL2(σ2θ + σ2L) + σ2u1).
Given the distributions of X1H and X1L, aggregate demand in the first period X1 and θ are
distributed jointly normal,
θ
X1H
∼ N
[(
θˆ
0
)
,
(
σ2θ β1HFHσ
2
θ
β1HFHσ
2
θ β1H
2FH
2(σ2θ + σ
2
H
) + σ2u1
)]
,
θ
X1L
∼ N
[(
θˆ
0
)
,
(
σ2θ β1LFLσ
2
θ
β1LFLσ
2
θ β1L
2FL
2(σ2θ + σ
2
L
) + σ2u1
)]
.
The variance of θ given X1,i is
V ar[θ|X1,i] = σ2θ −
(β1,iFiσ
2
θ)
2
β1,i
2Fi
2(σ2θ + σ
2
i) + σ
2
u1
=
β1,i
2Fi
2σ2θσ
2
i + σ
2
u1σ
2
θ
β1,i
2Fi
2(σ2θ + σ
2
i) + σ
2
u1
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Given the distributions of X1H and X1L, aggregate demand in the first period Xi and Si is
distributed jointly normal,
SH
X1H
∼ N
[(
θˆ
0
)
,
(
σ2θ + σ
2
H
β1HFH(σ
2
θ + σ
2
H
)
β1HFHσ
2
θ β1H
2FH
2(σ2θ + σ
2
H
) + σ2u1
)]
,
SL
X1L
∼ N
[(
θˆ
0
)
,
(
σ2θ + σ
2
L
β1LFL(σ
2
θ + σ
2
L
)
β1LFLσ
2
θ β1L
2FL
2(σ2θ + σ
2
L
) + σ2u1
)]
.
The joint distribution of Xi and Si is
SH
X1H
∼ N
[(
θˆ
0
)
,
(
σ2θ + σ
2
H
β1Hσ
2
θ
β1HFHσ
2
θ β1H
2FH
2(σ2θ + σ
2
H
) + σ2u1
)]
,
SL
X1L
∼ N
[(
θˆ
0
)
,
(
σ2θ + σ
2
L
β1Lσ
2
θ
β1LFLσ
2
θ β1L
2FL
2(σ2θ + σ
2
L
) + σ2u1
)]
.
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According to the distributions stated above, the conditional variance V ar[Si|X1,i] is given by
V ar[Si|X1,i] = σ2θ + σ2i −
(β1,iFi(σ
2
θ + σ
2
i))
2
β1,i
2Fi
2(σ2θ + σ
2
i) + σ
2
u1
=
σ2u1(σ
2
θ + σ
2
i)
β1,i
2Fi
2(σ2θ + σ
2
i) + σ
2
u1
=
σ2u1(σ
2
θ + σ
2
i)
2
β1,i
2σ4θ + σ
2
u1(σ
2
θ + σ
2
i)
.
(93)
The next distribution to be evaluated is the joint distribution of F (θ|X1,i) and F (X2,i|X1,i).
The first two moments of F (X2,i|X1,i) after the signal type is revealed are given by
E[X2,i|X1,i] = E
[
β2,i(E[θ|Si]− p∗1,i) + u2|X1,i
]
= E
[
β2,i(E[θ|Si]− p∗1,i)|X1,i
]
+ E [u2|X1,i]
= β2,i (E[θ|X1,i]− p∗1,i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+E [u2|X1,i]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
E[X2,i|X1,i] = 0
(94)
and
V AR[X2,i|X1,i] = V AR
[
β2,i(E[θ|Si]− p∗1,i) + u2|X1,i
]
= V AR
[
β2,i(E[θ|Si]− p∗1,i)|X1,i
]
+ V AR [u2|X1,i]
= β2,i
2V AR [E[θ|Si]|X1,i]︸ ︷︷ ︸
β2,i
2F 2i V AR[S|X1,i]
+σ2u2
= β2,i
2F 2i
σ2u1(σ
2
θ + σ
2
i)
2
β1,i
2σ4θ + σ
2
u1(σ
2
θ + σ
2
i)
+ σ2u2
V AR[X2,i|X1,i] = β2,i2
σ2u1σ
4
θ
β1,i
2σ4θ + σ
2
u1(σ
2
θ + σ
2
i)
+ σ2u2 .
(95)
The covariance conditional on the first period’s information COV [X2,i, θ|X1,i] is given by
COV [β2,iE[θ|Si], θ|X1,i] = COV [β2,i(θˆ + Fi(S − θˆ), θ|X1,i]
= COV [β2,iθˆ, θ|X1,i]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+COV [β2,iFi(S − θˆ), θ|X1,i]
= COV [β2,iFiS, θ|X1,i]
= COV [β2,iFiθ, θ|X1,i] + COV [β2,iFii, θ|X1,i]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= β2,iFi
(
E[θ2|X1,i]− E[θ|X1,i]2
)
COV [β2,iE[θ|Si], θ|X1,i] = β2,iFiV AR[θ|X1,i].
(96)
Knowing these parameters and given that F (θ|X1,i) and F (X2,i|X1,i) are jointly normal
distributed, one can calculate the price in period two, which is the expected liquidation value of
the risky asset θ conditional on the information set available to the market maker in period two;
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hence, E[θ|X1,i, X2,i, P1,i]. Applying again the projection theorem for jointly normal variables
yields
E[θ|X1,i, X2,i, P1,i] = P1,i + λ2,iX2,i. (97)
B.3 Equilibrium coefficients two-period setting
with λ2,i being
λ2,i =
COV [β2,iE[θ|Si], θ|X1,i]
V AR[X2,i|X1,i]
=
β2,iFiV AR[θ|X1,i]
β2,i
2F 2i V AR[S|X1,i] + σ2u2
,
knowing β2,i =
1
2λ2,i
, one can solve for β2,i, yielding
β2,i
2 =
σ2u2
(
β1,i
2σ4θ + σ
2
u1(σ
2
θ + σi
2)
)
)
σ4θ
(
2β1,i
2F 2i σi
2 + σ2u1
)
β2,i =
√
σ2u2(σ
2
θ + σi
2)
σ2θ
√
β1,i
2σ4θ + σ
2
u1(σ
2
θ + σi
2)
2β1,i
2σ4θσi
2 + σ2u1(σ
2
θ + σi
2)2
,
then λ2,i is given by
λ2,i =
σ2θ
2
√
σ2u2(σ
2
θ + σi
2)
√
2β1,i
2σ4θσi
2 + σ2u1(σ
2
θ + σi
2)2
β1,i
2σ4θ + σ
2
u1(σ
2
θ + σi
2)
.
Second-period coefficients for the case S = SL
β2L =
√
σ2u2(σ
2
θ + σL
2)
σ2θ
√
β1L
2σ4θ + σ
2
u1(σ
2
θ + σL
2)
2β1L
2σ4θσL
2 + σ2u1(σ
2
θ + σL
2)2
,
and
λ2L =
σ2θ
2
√
σ2u2(σ
2
θ + σL
2)
√
2β1L
2σ4θσL
2 + σ2u1(σ
2
θ + σL
2)2
β1L
2σ4θ + σ
2
u1(σ
2
θ + σL
2)
,
λ∗1H =
β1Hσ
4
θ
β1H
2σ4θ + σ
2
u(σ
2
θ + σ
2
H
)
λ∗1L =
β1Lσ
4
θ
β1L
2σ4θ + σ
2
u(σ
2
θ + σ
2
L
)
,
λ1 = (1− ωH) β1Lσ
4
θ
β1L
2σ4θ + σ
2
u(σ
2
θ + σ
2
L
)
+ ωH
β1Hσ
4
θ
β1H
2σ4θ + σ
2
u(σ
2
θ + σ
2
H
)
.
Plugging all coefficients into equation 30, β1L and β1H are implicitly defined by the following
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system of equations:
β1L =
(
σ2θ + σ
2
L
) 1√
σ2u2
√
σ4
θ
β2
1L
+σ2u1(σ2θ+σ2L)
2σ4
θ
β2
1L
σ2
L
+σ2u1(σ2θ+σ2L)2
− σ2θβ1L
σ4
θ
β4
1L
σ2
θ
+σ2
L
+σ2u1

2σ4θ(σ
2
θ+σ
2
L)
(
pβ1H
σ4
θ
β4
1H
+σ2
θ
σ2u1+σ
2
u1σ
2
H
+
β1L−pβ1L
σ4
θ
β4
1L
+σ2
θ
σ2u1+σ
2
u1σ
2
L
)
√
σ2u2
√
σ4
θ
β2
L
+σ2u1(σ2θ+σ2L)
2σ4
θ
β2
1L
σ2
L
+σ2u1(σ2θ+σ2L)2
− σ6θβ21L(
σ4
θ
β4
1L
σ2
θ
+σ2
L
+σ2u1
)
2
(98)
β1H =
(
σ2θ + σ
2
H
) 1√
σ2u2
√
σ4
θ
β2
1H
+σ2u1(σ2θ+σ2H)
2σ4
θ
β2
1H
σ2
H
+σ2u1(σ2θ+σ2H)2
− σ2θβ1H
σ4
θ
β4
1H
σ2
θ
+σ2
H
+σ2u1

2σ4θ(σ
2
h+σ
2
θ)
(
pβ1H
σ4
θ
β4
1H
+σ2
θ
σ2u1+σ
2
u1σ
2
H
+
β1L−pβ1L
σ4
θ
β4
1L
+σ2
θ
σ2u1+σ
2
u1σ
2
L
)
√
σ2u2
√
σ4
θ
β2
1H
+σ2u1(σ2θ+σ2H)
2σ4
θ
β2
1H
σ2
H
+σ2u1(σ2θ+σ2H)2
− σ6θβ21H(
σ4
θ
β4
1H
σ2
θ
+σ2
H
+σ2u1
)
2
. (99)
Expressions 98 and 99 can now be solved numerically for β1L and β1H .
B.4 Price behavior
Knowing that X2,i is mean zero, the expected price difference at the beginning of period two
∆P,i = P2,i − P1 is defined by
E[∆P,i|X1, i] = E[P2,i|X1,i]− P1
= E[P ∗1,i + λ2,iX2,i|X1,i]− P1
= P ∗1,i − P1.
(100)
The expected price movement can be characterized by the difference between the actual and
the hypothetical first-period price. Simplifying the expression, the expected price difference in
the respective regime writes
P ∗1L − P1 = ωH(E[θ|X1L]− E[θ|X1H ]) = ωH(λ∗1L − λ∗1H)X1
P ∗1H − P1 = (1− ωH)(E[θ|X1H ]− E[θ|X1L]) = (1− ωH)(λ∗1H − λ∗1L)X1.
(101)
Knowing the price differences given by 101, we proceed with the proof of proposition 2.
Proof. Proposition 2
First define:
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∆P1,i = P1 − P0 and ∆P2,i = P2,i − P1
cov(∆P1L∆P2L) = E[(P1 − P0)(P2L − P1)]− E[P1 − P0]E[P2L − P1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
= E[P1(P2L − P1)] = E[P1P2L − P 21 ] = E[P1P2L]− E[P 21 ]
= E[θˆ2] + λ1λ
∗
1LE[X
2
1L] + λ2LE[P1X2L]− E[θˆ2]− λ1λ1E[X21L]
= λ1λ
∗
1LE[X
2
1L] + λ2L (β2LE[P1(E[θ|SL]− P ∗1L)])− λ21E[X21L]
= λ1λ
∗
1LE[X
2
1L] + λ2Lβ2L
(
λ1β1LF
2
LV ar[SL]− λ1λ∗1LE[X21L]
)− λ21E[X21L]
=
1
2
λ1λ
∗
1LE[X
2
1L] +
1
2
λ1β1LF
2
LV ar[SL]− λ21E[X21L]
= λ1(
1
2
λ∗1L − λ1)E[X21L] +
1
2
λ1β1LF
2
LV ar[SL]
(102)
For cov(∆P1L∆P2L) > 0 equation 102 implies
(λ1 − 1
2
λ∗1L) <
1
2
β1LF
2
LV ar[SL]
E[X21L]
, (103)
using λ1 = (1− p)λ∗1L + pλ∗1H one gets
((
1
2
− p)λ∗1L + pλ∗1H) <
1
2
β1LF
2
LV ar[SL]
E[X21L]
,
((
1
2
− p)λ∗1L + pλ∗1H) <
1
2
β1LF
2
LV ar[SL]
E[X21L]
.
(104)
Knowing
β1LF
2
LV ar[SL]
E[X21L]
= λ∗1L,
the inequality reduces to
pλ∗1H < pλ
∗
1L
λ∗1H < λ
∗
1L
(105)
which is true by definition.
As the problem is symmetric, cov(∆P1H∆P2H) follows analogously
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cov(∆P1H∆P2H) = E[(P1 − P0)(P2H − P1)]− E[P1 − P0]E[P2H − P1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
= E[P1(P2H − P1)] = E[P1P2H − P 21 ] = E[P1P2H ]− E[P 21 ]
= E[θˆ2] + λ1λ
∗
1HE[X
2
1H ] + λ2HE[P1X2H ]− E[θˆ2]− λ1λ1E[X21H ]
= λ1λ
∗
1HE[X
2
1H ] + λ2H (β2HE[P1(E[θ|SH ]− P ∗1H)])− λ21E[X21H ]
= λ1λ
∗
1HE[X
2
1H ] + λ2Hβ2H
(
λ1β1HF
2
HV ar[SH ]− λ1λ∗1HE[X21H ]
)− λ21E[X21H ]
=
1
2
λ1λ
∗
1HE[X
2
1H ] +
1
2
λ1β1HF
2
HV ar[SH ]− λ21E[X21H ]
= λ1(
1
2
λ∗1H − λ1)E[X21H ] +
1
2
λ1β1HF
2
HV ar[SH ]
(106)
For cov(∆P1H∆P2L) < 0 equation 106 implies
λ1 >
1
2
β1HF
2
HV ar[SH ]
E[X21H ]
+
1
2
λ∗1H . (107)
Knowing
β1HF
2
HV ar[SH ]
E[X21H ]
= λ∗1H , (108)
the inequality reduces to
λ∗1H < λ1 which implies λ
∗
1H < λ
∗
1L. (109)
C Sequential equilibrium
C.1 Optimization
Optimization for the periods (m, ..., N)
Plugging Um, Vm and Pi,m−1 into the maximization yields
max
xm
Em[ (θ − (Pi,m−1 + λi,m(xm + um)))xm
+ αm (θ − (Pi,m−1 + λi,m(xm + um)))2 + δm|Si]
max
xm
Em[ (θ − (Pi,m−1 + λi,m(xm + um)))xm
+ αm((θ − Pi,m−1)2 − 2λi,m(xm + um)(θ − Pi,m−1)
+ λ2i,m(xm + um)
2) + δm|Si].
(110)
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The resulting FOC regarding xm is:
0 = Em[θ − Pi,m−1 − 2λi,mxm − λi,mum
+ 2αm (θ − (Pi,m−1 + λi,m(xm + um))) (−λi,m)|Si]
0 = Em[θ|Si]− Pi,m−1 − 2λi,mxm
+ 2αm(Em[θ|Si]− Pi,m−1)(−λi,m) + 2αmλ2i,mxm
(111)
Solving for xm:
2λi,mxm − 2αmλ2i,mxm = (Em[θ|Si]− Pi,m−1)
− 2αmλi,m(Em[θ|Si]− Pi,m−1)
xm2λi,m(1− αmλi,m) = (1− 2αmλi,m)(Em[θ|Si]− Pi,m−1)
(112)
xm =
(1− 2αmλi,m)
2λi,m(1− αmλi,m)(Em[θ|Si]− Pi,m−1) (113)
The SOC is given by:
2λi,m(1− αmλi,m) > 0 (114)
Optimization for the first period, given the result from period (m−N)
max
x1
E[(θ − θˆ − λ1(x1 + u1))x1 + (θ − θˆ − λ∗1,i(x1 + u1)− λi,m(xm + um))xm
+ αm(θ − θˆ − λ∗1,i(x1 + u1)− λi,m(xm + um))2 + δm|Si]
max
x1
E[(θ − θˆ − λ1(x1 + u1))x1 + (θ − θˆ − λ∗1,i(x1 + u1)− λi,m(xm + um))xm
+ αm(θ − θˆ − λ∗1,i(x1 + u1))2 − 2αm(θ − θˆ − λ∗1,i(x1 + u1))λi,m(xm + um)
+ αm(λi,m(xm + um))
2 + δm|Si]
(115)
max
x1
E[(θ − θˆ − λ1(x1 + u1))x1 + (θ − θˆ − λ∗1,i(x1 + u1))xm − λi,m(x2m + xmum)
+ αm(θ − θˆ − λ∗1,i(x1 + u1))2 − 2αmλi,m(θ − θˆ − λ∗1,i(x1 + u1))xm
− 2αmλi,m(θ − θˆ − λ∗1,i(x1 + u1))um
+ αmλ
2
i,m(x
2
m + 2xmum + u
2
m) + δm|Si]
(116)
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Taking expectations:
max
x1
E[(θ − θˆ − λ1(x1 + u1))|Si]x1 + E[(θ − θˆ − λ∗1,i(x1 + u1))xm|Si]
− E[λi,m(x2m + xmum)|Si] + E[αm(θ − θˆ − λ∗1,i(x1 + u1))2|Si]
− 2E[αmλi,m(θ − θˆ − λ∗1,i(x1 + u1))xm|Si]
− 2E[αmλi,m(θ − θˆ − λ∗1,i(x1 + u1))um|Si]
+ E[αmλ
2
i,m(x
2
m + 2xmum + u
2
m)|Si] + E[δm|Si]
max
x1
E[(θ − θˆ − λ1x1)|Si]x1 + E[(θ − θˆ − λ∗1,ix1)xm|Si]
− E[λi,mx2m|Si] + E[αm(θ − θˆ)2|Si]− 2E[αmλ∗1,ix1(θ − θˆ)|Si]
+ E[αλ∗1,i
2(x1 + u1)
2|Si]
− 2E[αmλi,m(θ − θˆ − λ∗1,ix1)xm|Si]
+ E[αmλ
2
i,m(x
2
m + u
2
m)|Si] + E[δm|Si]
max
x1
E[(θ − θˆ − λ1x1)|Si]x1 + E[(θ − θˆ − λ∗1,ix1)xm|Si]
− E[λi,mx2m|Si] + E[αm(θ − θˆ)2|Si]− 2E[αmλ∗1,ix1(θ − θˆ)|Si]
+ E[αmλ
∗
1,i
2x21|Si]− 2E[αmλi,m(θ − θˆ − λ∗1,ix1)xm|Si]
+ E[αmλ
2
i,mx
2
m|Si]
+ E[αmλ
2
i,mu
2
m|Si] + E[αmλ∗1,i2u21|Si] + E[δm|Si]
(117)
Using the fact that
xm =
(1− 2αmλi,m)
2λi,m(1− αmλi,m)(Em[θ|Si]− θˆ − λ
∗
1,i(x1 + u1)), (118)
and defining
ψ =
(1− 2αmλi,m)
2λi,m(1− αmλi,m) ,
ϕ = (E[θ|Si]− θˆ),
yields
xm = ψ(ϕ− λ∗1,i(x1 + u1)). (119)
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Plugging in for xm:
max
x1
E[(θ − θˆ − λ1x1)|Si]x1 + E[(θ − θˆ − λ∗1,ix1)(ψ(ϕ− λ∗1,i(x1 + u1)))|Si]
− E[λi,m(ψ(ϕ− λ∗1,i(x1 + u1)))2|Si] + E[αm(θ − θˆ)2|Si]
− 2E[αmλ∗1,ix1(θ − θˆ)|Si] + E[αmλ∗1,i2x21|Si]
− 2E[αmλi,m(θ − θˆ − λ∗1,ix1)(ψ(ϕ− λ∗1,i(x1 + u1)))|Si]
+ E[αmλ
2
i,m(ψ(ϕ− λ∗1,i(x1 + u1)))2|Si]
+ αmλ
2
i,mE[u
2
m|Si] + αmλ∗1,i2E[u21|Si] + E[δm|Si]
max
x1
E[(θ − θˆ − λ1x1)|Si]x1 + E[(θ − θˆ − λ∗1,ix1)(ψ(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1))|Si]
− E[λi,m(ψ(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1))2|Si] + E[αm(θ − θˆ)2|Si]
− 2E[αmλ∗1,ix1(θ − θˆ)|Si] + E[αmλ∗1,i2x21|Si]
− 2E[αmλi,m(θ − θˆ − λ∗1,ix1)(ψ(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1))|Si]
+ E[αmλ
2
i,m(ψ(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1))2|Si]
− E[λi,m(ψλ∗1,iu1)2|Si] + E[αmλ2i,m(ψλ∗1,iu1)2|Si]
+ αmλ
2
i,mE[u
2
m|Si] + αmλ∗1,i2E[u21|Si] + E[δm|Si]
(120)
Taking expectations, rearranging and collecting terms:
max
x1
(ϕ− λ1x1)x1 + (ϕ− λ∗1,ix1)(ψ(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1))
− λi,m(ψ(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1))2
− 2αmλ∗1,ix1ϕ+ αmλ∗1,i2x21
− 2αmλi,m(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1)(ψ(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1))
+ αmλ
2
i,m(ψ(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1))2
− λi,m(ψλ∗1,i)2σ2u1 + αmλ2i,m(ψλ∗1,i)2σ2u1
+ αmλ
2
i,mσ
2
um + αmλ
∗
1,i
2σ2u1 + E[δm|Si] + αmE[(θ − θˆ)2|Si]
max
x1
(ϕ− λ1x1)x1 + ψ(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1)2
− λi,mψ2(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1)2
− 2αmλ∗1,ix1ϕ+ αmλ∗1,i2x21
− 2αmλi,mψ(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1)2
+ αmλ
2
i,mψ
2(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1)2
− λi,m(ψλ∗1,i)2σ2u1 + αmλ2i,m(ψλ∗1,i)2σ2u1
+ αmλ
2
i,mσ
2
um + αmλ
∗
1,i
2σ2u1 + E[δm|Si] + αmE[(θ − θˆ)2|Si]
(121)
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Taking the first derivative regarding x1 yields the FOC:
0 =ϕ− 2λ1x1 + 2ψ(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1)(−λ∗1,i)
− 2λi,mψ2(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1)(−λ∗1,i)− 2λ∗1,iϕ
+ 2αmλ
∗
1,i
2x1 − 4αmλi,mψ(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1)(−λ∗1,i)
+ 2αmλ
2
i,mψ
2(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1)(−λ∗1,i)
0 =ϕ− 2λ1x1 − 2ψλ∗1,i(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1) + 2ψ2λ∗1,iλi,m(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1)
− 2αmλ∗1,iϕ+ 2αmλ∗1,i2x1 + 4αmψλ∗1,iλi,m(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1)
− 2αmψ2λ∗1,iλ2i,m(ϕ− λ∗1,ix1)
(122)
Rearranging and collecting terms:
0 =ϕ− 2λ1x1 + 2λ∗1,i2(ψλi,m − 1)(αmψλi,m − αm − ψ)x1
− 2λ∗1,i(ψλi,m − 1)(αmψλi,m − αm − ψ)ϕ
(123)
Finally, solving for x1 yields:
x1 =
2λ∗1,i(ψλi,m − 1)(αmψλi,m − αm − ψ)− 1
2λ∗1,i
2(ψλi,m − 1)(αmψλi,m − αm − ψ)− 2λ1
ϕ. (124)
Substituting back
ψ =
(1− 2αmλi,m)
2λi,m(1− αmλi,m)
ϕ = (E[θ|Si]− θˆ)
gives
x1 =
λ∗1,i + 2λi,m(αmλi,m − 1)
λ∗1,i
2 + 4λ1λi,m(αmλi,m − 1)
(E[θ|Si]− θˆ)
x1 =
2λi,m(1− αmλi,m)− λ∗1,i
4λ1λi,m(1− αmλi,m)− λ∗1,i2
(E[θ|Si]− θˆ).
(125)
With the SOC:
0 < 2λ1 − 2λ∗1,i2(ψλi,m − 1)(αmψλi,m − αm − ψ)
0 <
λ∗1,i
2 + 4λ1λi,m(αmλi,m − 1)
2λi,m(αmλi,m − 1)
0 <
4λ1λi,m(1− αmλi,m)− λ∗1,i2
2λi,m(1− αmλi,m)
(126)
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C.2 Equilibrium coefficients N-period setting
Plugging in the optimized value of xm:
xm = ψ(ϕ− λ∗1,i(x1 + u1)) (127)
E[ (θ − (Pi,m−1 + λi,m(ψ(E[θ|Si]− Pi,m−1) + um)))ψ(E[θ|Si]− Pi,m−1)
+ αm (θ − (Pi,m−1 + λi,m(ψ(E[θ|Si]− Pi,m−1) + um)))2 + δm|Si]
(128)
Taking expectations
(E[θ|Si]− (Pi,m−1 + λi,m(ψ(E[θ|Si]− Pi,m−1)))ψ(E[θ|Si]− Pi,m−1)
+ αmE[(θ − (Pi,m−1 + λi,m(ψ(E[θ|Si]− Pi,m−1) + um)))2 |Si] + δm
(129)
ψ(E[θ|Si]− Pi,m−1)2 − λi,m(ψ(E[θ|Si]− Pi,m−1))2
+ αmE[(θ − (Pi,m−1)2 − 2λi,m(ψ(E[θ|Si]− Pi,m−1)(θ − Pi,m−1)
+ λi,m
2(ψ(E[θ|Si]− Pi,m−1)2|Si] + αmλi,m2σ2um + δm
= ψ(E[θ|Si]− Pi,m−1)2 − λi,m(ψ(E[θ|Si]− Pi,m−1))2
+ αm(E[θ|Si]− Pi,m−1)2 − 2λi,mψ(E[θ|Si]− Pi,m−1)2
+ λi,m
2(ψ(E[θ|Si]− Pi,m−1)2|Si] + αmλi,m2σ2um + δm,
(130)
which can be rewritten as
(ψ − λi,mψ2 + αm − 2αmλi,mψ + αm + λi,m2ψ2)(E[θ|Si]− Pi,m−1)2
+ αmλi,m
2σ2um + δm.
(131)
This yields
αm−1 = (ψ − λi,mψ2 + αm − 2αmλi,mψ + αm + λi,m2ψ2),
which simplifies to
αm−1 =
1
4λi,m(1− αmλi,m) . (132)
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The expected utility of the informed in the first period is given by:
α0 =
λi,m(1− αmλi,m)− λ∗1,i + λ1
4λ1λi,m(1− αmλi,m)− λ∗1,i2
(133)
The overall utility of the informed trader writes:
E[pi|Si] =
λi,m(1− αmλi,m)− λ∗1,i + λ1
4λ1λi,m(1− αmλi,m)− λ∗1,i2
Fi(S − θˆ)
+
λ∗1,i
2σ2u1
4λi,m(1− αmλi,m) + δ1
(134)
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